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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-DUE PROCESS-STANDARD

OF REVIEW

FOR

United
States Supreme Court has held that the retroactive application of
ECONOMIC

LEGISLATION-RETROACTIVE

APPLICATION-The

withdrawal liability provisions of the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 is constitutional and that the appropriate standard of review for such economic legislation when challenged as violative of due process is the minimum rationality test
of Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct.
2709 (1984).
In 1974 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),1 to, among other things, protect those employees adversely affected by the termination of their private pension
plans due to insufficient funding by the employer.2 The act provided for a plan termination insurance program to be administered
by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).s Payment
of guaranteed benefits by the PBGC under multiemployer pension
plans was discretionary until January 1, 1978, while the guarantee

of payments under single employer pension plans was effective immediately upon the Act's passage."
Shortly before mandatory coverage of multiemployer plans was
to become effective, Congress became aware of the unstable financial condition of numerous pension plans.5 It feared that should
mandatory coverage of multiemployer plans take effect as planned
under ERISA, the stability of the PBGC would be in jeopardy due
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
2. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709, 2713 (1984).
3. Id. Under Title IV of ERISA, the PBGC, a wholly-owned government corporation
within the Department of Labor, was to collect insurance premiums from covered pension
plans and provide benefits to those employees whose plans had failed due to insufficient
funding. Id.
4. Id. 29 U.S.C. § 1381(c)(1) (1976). Under ERISA, a withdrawing employer from a
multiemployer plan only faced contingent liability. The liability was conditioned upon the
plan's termination within five years of withdrawal. If the plan did terminate, the employer
would be liable for its proportionate share. However, even if the plan did not terminate, a
withdrawing employer would be liable if the PBGC decided to insure the plan's beneficiaries. In either case, no individual employer's liability could exceed 30% of its net worth.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1362(b)(2), 1364, 1381(c)(2)-(4) (1976).
5. 104 S. Ct. at 2714.
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to the excessive liability it could be forced to assume.' To safeguard the program, Congress deferred mandatory coverage of multiemployer plans until August 1, 1980. In the interim, Congress
focused its attention on correcting the defects in ERISA associated
with withdrawal liability.8
After extensive examination of the program, Congress enacted
the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA).9 The MPPAA set forth the financial liability for employers
who withdrew from multiemployer pension plans. 10 To discourage
participating employers from withdrawing before the MPPAA became effective, the withdrawal liability provisions were applied retroactively.1 1 The effective date for the withdrawal liability provisions was April 29, 1980, five months before the MPPAA was to
12
become law.
R.A. Gray & Co. (Gray), an Oregon building and construction
company, became a participant in the Oregon-Washington
Carpenters-Employers Pension Trust Fund (Pension Plan)
through collective-bargaining agreements with the Oregon State
Council of Carpenters (Council). 13 In February of 1980 Gray informed the Council of .its decision not to renew the collective-argaining agreement upon its termination on June 1, 1980.1" Gray's
6. Id.
7. See Pub. L. No. 96-293, 94 Stat. 610 (1980). The PBGC's discretionary authority to
insure plans terminating during the interim was also extended. 104 S. Ct. at 2714.
8. Id. The PBGC was also directed to prepare a report analyzing the problems associated with withdrawals from multiemployer plans. On July 1, 1978, the PBGC issued its
report, stating that out of 2000 covered plans, about 10% were in financial trouble, thus
jeopardizing the benefits of nearly 1.3 million participants. Termination of these plans
would result in liability of 4.8 billion dollars to the PBGC if it were to assume liability.
Thus, one of the recommendations of the report was to provide a disincentive to voluntary
employer withdrawals. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Multiemployer Study Required by P.L. No. 95-214 (1978). R.A. Gray & Co. v. Oregon Washington Carpenters-Employers Pension Trust Fund, 549 F. Supp. 531, 535 (D. Or. 1982).
9. 104 S. Ct. at 2715. See Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980).
10. 104 S. Ct. at 2715. Withdrawal liability was determined to be "the employer's proportionate share of the plan's 'unfunded vested benefits,' calculated as the difference between the present value of the vested benefits and the current value of the plan's assets. 29
U.S.C. § 1381, 1391." Id...
11. Id. Congress chose an effective date prior to enactment to prevent employers from
avoiding the adverse consequences of withdrawal liability by withdrawing from plans while
such liability was being considered. Id.
12. Id. The MPPAA was signed into law on September 26, 1980. Id.
13. 104 S. Ct. at 2715-16. The MPPAA defines a multiemployer pension plan as one
"which is maintained pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements between one
or more employee organizations and more than one employer." 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3)
(1982).
14. 104 S. Ct. at 2716.
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continued involvement in the building and construction industry
rendered its withdrawal from the
pension plan complete pursuant
5
1383(b)(2)(B).1
§
U.S.C.
to 29
Gray was notified of its withdrawal liability by the PBGC, 6
since the withdrawal fell within the five month retroactive period
provided by the MPPAA. 17 Despite the establishment of a payment schedule by the PBGC, no payment was made by Gray. 8
Thereafter, Gray filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against both the Pension Plan and the PBGC.' 9 Gray alleged that
the retroactive application of the withdrawal liability provisions of
the MPPAA violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment.20 Additionally, Gray asserted that the provisions could not
not be constitutionally sustained because of the arbitrary distinction between single and multiemployer plans.2
The district court granted summary judgment for the Pension
Plan and the PBGC, holding that the retroactive application of
withdrawal liability under the MPPAA did not violate Gray's due
process rights2 2 Gray appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 3 In reversing the district court, the
court of appeals held that the retroactive withdrawal liability violated Gray's due process rights under the fifth amendment.2"
An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was taken by
both the Pension Plan and the PBGC2 5 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the retroactive imposition of withdrawal liability under the MPPAA prior
to its enactment did not violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.26
15. Id. 29 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(2)(B) (1982) provides that a "withdrawal occurs under this
paragraph if the employer continues to perform work in the jurisdiction of the collective
bargaining agreement of the type for which contributions were previously required."
16. 104 S. Ct. at 2716. Gray's withdrawal liability was x assessed at $201,359. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that"'[nlo person. . . shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
21. 104 S. Ct. at 2716 & n.5. The district court rejected this argument and it was not
reached by the court of appeals. Therefore, the issue of discrimination against multiemployer plans was not considered by the Supreme Court. Id. at 2716 n.5.
22. Id. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
23. 104 S. Ct. at 2717.
24. Id. at 2718. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
25. 104 S. Ct. at 2718. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Id.
26. Id. at 2713.
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Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, indicated that this case
was one subject to the limited judicial review customarily applied
to economic legislation when challenged as being violative of due
process.2 7 He began his analysis by identifying the proper inquiry
to be used when testing the constitutionality of economic legislation such as the MPPAA.2 8 The proper inquiry, according to Justice Brennan, was that of minimum rationality as espoused by the
Court in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.29 Under the Turner
Elkhorn standard, an economic statute will be upheld against a
due process attack when it is supported by a legitimate legislative
purpose furthered by rational means.3 0 The person complaining of
the due process violation must establish that Congress has acted in
an arbitrary and irrational manner.3 1 Justice Brennan therefore
found that, where legislation which shifts economic burdens and
benefits, such as that involved in Gray and Turner Elkhorn, comes
under the scrutiny of the Court, the legislation will be granted a
presumption of constitutionality.3 2 This presumption, according to
the Court, applies even when an act is given retroactive effect.33
Under Turner Elkhorn, the retroactive provisions, however, still
must meet the test of rationality, that is, they must be rationally
related to a legitimate legislative objective.3 ' Justice Brennan recognized that the underlying purpose behind this presumption is
that the Court should not interfere with congressional discretion in
planning and implementing a national economic policy.35 Justice
Brennan concluded that, under the rationality standard of Turner
Elkhorn, an economic statute, even one involving retroactivity, will
27. Id. at 2719.
28. Id. at 2717.
29. 428 U.S. 1 (1976). In Turner Elkhorn, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the retroactive application of the Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969.
Title IV of the Act required mine operators to compensate former employees affected by
pneumoconiosis even though those employees had terminated their work in the industry
before the statute was enacted. After enactment of Title IV, several mine owners filed suit
alleging that the retroactive application of the Act to compensate former employees violated
due process. In sustaining the constitutionality of the retroactive application of the Act, the
Court concluded that the retroactivity provision passed the test of minimum rationality.
Thus, the Court deferred to Congress' judgment that the Act was a rational measure to
spread the cost of employees' disabilities among those who profited from their work-the
mine operators and consumers of coal in general. Id. at 15-17.
30. 428 U.S. at 15-20.
31. Id. at 15.
32. 104 S.Ct. at 2717-18.
33. Id. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
34. 428 U.S. at 17.
35. 104 S. Ct. at 2718. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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be found to be constitutional so long as it is rationally related to a
legitimate legislative purpose."
Justice Brennan found that the MPPAA easily passed this rational purpose test; that a rational basis for retroactive application
of the withdrawal liability existed was evident from the legislative
history.3 7 Retroactive application was mandated as a necessary
means of discouraging participating employers from withdrawing
from the pension plans to avoid liability before enactment of the
MPPAA.3 5 Congress, through retroactive application, was ensuring
the stability of the pension plans for the benefit of the covered
employees."
Justice Brennan then dismissed the two other contentions made
by Gray: first, that retroactive application violates due process because notice was inadequate to inform -employers of changes in
their legal obligations;'0 and second, that constitutional standards
developed under the contract clause4 1 be applied to the federal action at issue.42 In rejecting Gray's first contention, Justice Brennan
indicated that the employers had sufficient notice of withdrawal
liability because it had been imposed by ERISA, and because of
knowledge of congressional activity on the subject."3 As to the sec36. Id.
37. Id. at 2718-19. Senator Matsunaga during debate on the MPPAA stated that the
retroactive effective date was necessary "to prevent any employer from withdrawing from a
plan under the lenient rules in current law. To permit the withdrawal of these opportunistic
employers without imposition of liability, would shift the entire burden on employers remaining as plan participants." 126 CONG. REc. S10156 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (remarks of
Sen. Matsunaga). See also id. at S10099-10102 (statement of Sen. Javits).
38. 104 S.Ct. at 2719. See supra notes 4 & 11.
39. 104 S.Ct. at 2718.
40. Id. at 2719.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o state shall.
pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts .... Id.
42. 104 S.Ct. at 2719. For cases applying a contract clause analysis, see Allied Structural Steel Corp. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), where the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the application of the Minnesota Private Pension Benefit Protection Act to
an Illinois corporate pension plan. The Court found the Act to be violative of the contract
clause since it changed private contractual rights by imposing a pension funding charge
which increased many employers' liability under their pension plans. Id. at 244-51. See also
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), where the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional as violative of the contract clause the retroactive repeal of the 1962
covenant between New Jersey and New York which limited the ability of the Port Authorities of both states to subsidize rail passenger transportation from revenues and reserves
pledged as security for consolidated bonds. The Court held that this repeal violated the
contract rights of the bondholders by eliminating an important security interest. Id. at 2832.
43. 104 S.Ct. at 2719. The numerous proposals debated by Congress before enactment
of the MPPAA uniformly included retroactive effective dates. Id.
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ond contention, Justice Brennan stated that the principles found
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment are not coextensive with prohibitions under the contract clause of state impairments of pre-existing contracts."" Justice Brennan therefore concluded that the standard of review under the contract clause did
not differ in degree from the rationality standard of Turner
45
Elkhorn.
On the basis of this analysis, the Court concluded that the retroactive application of the withdrawal liability provisions of the MPPAA were not violative of due process since a rational basis was
established for the legislation.46
Prior to the Gray decision the courts were at odds in determining the applicable test to be used in appraising the constitutionality of the retroactive withdrawal liability imposed by the MPPAA.
Economic legislation, such as the MPPAA, when challenged as violative of due process, had been traditionally subjected to the rational purpose test as recently reflected in Turner Elkhorn.47 Although the rational purpose test thus seemed to be the appropriate
inquiry to resolve the MPPAA due process challenge, the courts
were confused by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Nachman Corp.
4
v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. 8
In deciding what was to be the appropriate inquiry in assessing
the constitutionality of the retroactive liability effect of ERISA,
the Nachman court appeared to have developed a hybrid test to be
used when analyzing a due process challenge to economic legislation. The Nachman court recognized that the traditional test for
analyzing such legislation was the rational purpose test of Turner
Elkhorn.4 ' To assess rationality, however, the court adopted a four
44. Id. at 2720.
45. Id. The Court also noted that the contract clause could not justifiably be claimed
to apply to actions of the federal government. See id. at 2719 n.9.
46. Id. at 2720.
47. See Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15-18. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act which imposed, among other things, a $560 million
limitation on liability for nuclear accidents resulting from the operation of federally licensed
private nuclear plants. The Court found a rational relationship between the statutory liability and Congress' desire for stimulating private industry's involvement in the production of
nuclear energy. Id. at 83-84.
48. 592 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 446 U.S. 359 (1980). Nachman sustained the
constitutionality of the retroactive application of ERISA. The court held that no due process rights were violated despite the imposition of liability on employers for unfunded
vested retirement benefits. Prior to ERISA, employers could escape such liability through
the use of liability-limiting clauses in their pension plans. Id. at 951.
49. Id. at 958.
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factor test.5 0 In applying this test, a court is to look first to the
reliance interests of the parties involved; second, to whether the
impairment of the private interest is affected in an area previously
subjected to regulatory control; third, to the equities of imposing
the legislative burden; and fourth, to the inclusion of statutory
provisions designed to limit and moderate the impact of the burden imposed.5 1 In establishing these four factors, the Nachman
court denied that it was breaking with the rationality standard of
Turner Elkhorn.52 Consideration of these factors, the court asserted, was merely to be undertaken so that a meaningful determination of rationality could be made.5 3 Without a consideration of
these factors, the court felt that no meaningful assessment of rationality was possible.54
In light of the Nachman decision, the district courts were uncertain as to whether the applicable test in analyzing the constitutionality of the retroactive withdrawal liability was still the rational
purpose test of Turner Elkhorn, or whether it had been replaced
by the four factor test. Most district courts recognized that both
tests were applicable; however, the Nachman test was the prevalent standard used by the courts in assessing the constitutionality
of the retroactive withdrawal liability of the MPPAA 5
An example of this judicial uncertainty is illustrated in the district court decision in R.A. Gray & Co. v. Oregon Washington
Carpenters-Employers Pension Trust Fund.5 In Gray, the court
adopted the Nachman test as the appropriate standard of review
when it was faced with deciding the constitutionality of the retroactive liability." A consideration of the four rationality factors required by Nachman resulted in a determination by the court that
the retroactive withdrawal liability of the MPPAA was constitutional.5 8 In reaching this determination, the court found that there
50. Id. at 960.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. & n.26.
55. See Republic Indus. v. Teamsters Joint Council, 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983); Coronet Dodge v. Speckmann, 553 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Mo. 1982); S & M Paving, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 539 F. Supp. 867 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
56. 549 F. Supp. 531 (D. Or. 1982).
57. Id. at 535.
58. Id. at 535-38. Specifically, the court found: (1) Gray's reliance on the contingent
liability under ERISA to be outweighed by the employee's interest in receiving his vested
retirement benefits; (2) pension plans have been substantially regulated in the past, thus the
MPPAA was not novel legislation; (3) the congressional purpose for imposing retroactive
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was rational support for Congress' decision to impose retroactive
liability to discourage employer withdrawals before the enactment
of the MPPAA.
On appeal Gray was consolidated with Shelter Framing Corp. v.
Carpenters Pension Trust (Shelter Framing 1).60 The district
court in the latter case, via the Nachman test, reached a contrary
decision to that of the Gray district court, holding that the retroactive withdrawal liability of the MPPAA was unconstitutional as violative of due process.6 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upon
consideration of the two cases in Shelter Framing Corp. v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. (Shelter Framing11)62 upheld the Shelter
FramingI court's conclusion that the retroactive withdrawal liability of the MPPAA was unconstitutional. 3
The court's analysis in Shelter Framing II illustrates the broad
discretion that a court has under the Nachman test to pass judgment on economic legislation. The Nachman test, by authorizing
consideration of factors such as the reliance interests and the inclusion of moderating features in the legislation, effectively allowed
the court to determine not only whether the choice made by the
legislature was rationally related to a legitimate state interest, but
whether it was a wise choice as determined by the court. For example, in applying the Nachman test in Shelter FramingII, the court
gave greater weight to the employer's reliance on existing law than
did the court in Gray.e 4 Under Nachman, the weight to be given to
each of the four factors was within the exclusive discretion of the
court, thus, in effect, allowing the reviewing court to emphasize
withdrawal liability outweighed the employer's desire to avoid liability; and (4) the MPPAA
contained sufficient moderating features designed to ease the burden of retroactive liability.

Id.
59. Id. at 538. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
60. 543 F. Supp. 1234 (C.D. Cal. 1982), consolidated on appeal in 705 F.2d 1502 (9th
Cir. 1983).
61. 543 F. Supp. at 1249-54. The court found: (1) the employer's reliance on existing
law to be reasonable since, outside the tax area, no one should be expected to predict congressional action which imposes liability on them; (2) no prior legislation in the pension plan
area was as drastic in scope as the MPPAA; (3) other less burdensome alternatives besides
imposing retroactive withdrawal liability were available to Congress; and (4) the MPPAA
lacked adequate moderating features. Thus, the court found the retroactive withdrawal liability unconstitutional under the Nachman test. Id.
62. 705 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1983).
63. Id. at 1515.
64. Id. at 1511. The court stated that no one should be expected to anticipate congressional action which imposes new liability on them, especially where the proposed statute
changed in substance numerous times, as did the MPPAA, while pending in Congress. Id.
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those factors which it considered to be the most important.6 5 The
discretionary nature of the test is further illustrated by the Shelter
Framing H court's treatment of the other Nachman factors. With
respect to the second factor, the court again disagreed with the district court in Gray as to whether there had been substantial regulation in the pension plan area prior to the MPPAA. 6 The Shelter
Framing H court determined that for such a statute to be valid, it
must be similar in nature and degree to previous regulation in the
area. 7 In the court's opinion, the MPPAA imposed such unexpected and drastic liability that it clearly was not similar to any
prior regulation. Thus, the court was imposing its own requirement for economic regulation and not merely deciding whether retroactivity was related to a legitimate legislative purpose. 9
In balancing the equities of imposing the legislative burden, as
required by the third factor of Nachman, the Shelter Framing H
court found in favor of the withdrawing employers.70 In support of
this determination, the court suggested that other types of programs would achieve the goal of ensuring the stability of pension
plans without imposing the harsh retroactive liability of the MPPAA. 7" The court's analysis of the third factor clearly demonstrates how a court could use the Nachman test not merely to determine whether the minimum rationality standard is satisfied, but
to pass judgment on the wisdom of the actual policy decision made
by Congress. In finding that the equities weighed against imposing
retroactive liability, the Shelter Framing H court was not merely
65. See generally Washington Star Co. v. International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502, 1507-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where the court noted the discretionary nature of the Nachman test by recognizing that the test provides "no standards.
other than 'mere judicial approval or disapproval of the balance struck by Congress' to
guide courts in their review." Id. at 1508 (quoting Nachman, 592 F.2d at 960). See also text
accompanying notes 124-25.
66. 705 F.2d at 1512.
67. Id. To support this conclusion, the court relied on FHA v. The Darlington, Inc.,
358 U.S. 84 (1958), where the Supreme Court upheld an amendment to regulations regarding the rental of property financed by federally insured loans, holding that the amendment
was merely a clarification of existing law and not a new policy. Id. at 90-92.
68. 705 F.2d at 1512.
69. See id. The court was, in effect, using the Nachman test to usurp a properly made
legislative judgment, an action the Nachman court warned against in its opinion. See Nachman, 592 F.2d at 960.
70. 705 F.2d at 1514. The balancing of the equities involved a weighing of the individual burdens imposed on the withdrawing employers against the policies furthered by Congress' decision to impose retroactive liability. Id.
71. Id. The court also noted that the withdrawing employers were still subject to contingent liability under ERISA. Id.
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inquiring into whether Congress' decision was founded upon a rational purpose, but whether it made the best choice. The court
suggested that there were other alternatives available to Congress,
such as modification of ERISA that would have provided a "safety
net" for a pension plan that failed.72
An examination of the Shelter Framing H court's analysis of the
fourth Nachman factor, the inclusion of statutory moderating features, also demonstrates the court's imposition of its judgment
over that of the legislature.73 The court found the legislature's
choice of statutory moderating features to be grossly inadequate,
noting that ERISA included more effective mitigating features
than the MPPAA.74 In effect, the court was judging the wisdom of
the statutory moderating features and was not determining
75
whether they were rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Thus, the use of the Nachman test clearly represented a break
from traditional judicial deference to Congress in economic matters by allowing the court to impose its judgment on the policy
choice made by Congress.
Under the traditional rational purpose test of Turner Elkhorn,
the role of the reviewing court was not to determine whether the
choice made by Congress was grounded in logic, but whether the
choice was in fact based upon a rational purpose. 7 As the Supreme
Court stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,77 "[even if a statute] may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases,
[the choice is up to the legislature]. . . . It is enough that there is
an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that
the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct
72. Id. The court suggested that employers could have been required to post a bond
upon their withdrawal to secure funds in the event that the plan failed. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The court noted the absence of three major moderating features of ERISA: the
contingent nature of the liability, the liability limit of 30% of an employer's net worth, and
the calculation based solely on the amount guaranteed by the PBGC, rather than the full
value of the employees' vested benefits. Id.
75. See id. The court failed to discuss whether or not the statutory provisions were
rational, but was merely pointing out their ineffectiveness. For example, the court stated
that the assessment of liability in monthly installments, as opposed to a lump sum payment,
failed to mitigate the burden of withdrawal liability. Id. This clearly is a judgment on the
policy choice made by Congress, and outside the scope of judicial review espoused by the
Turner Elkhorn Court.
76. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
77. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). In Williamson, the Supreme Court upheld an Oklahoma statute requiring a prescription from an optometrist before an optician could fit eyeglass lenses
into frames. Id. at 491.
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it."' 8 The Nachman test was, in essence, changing the role of the
court in reviewing economic legislation by subjecting the economic
legislation to a form of heightened scrutiny.
Other courts, however, refused to accept the Nachman test as
appropriate in analyzing due process challenges to the MPPAA.
Instead, they chose to follow the traditional rational purpose test
79
of Turner Elkhorn.
The Seventh Circuit in Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp.8 0 expressly rejected the idea that the MPPAA should be subjected to any form of heightened scrutiny, including that of the
Nachman test.8 1 The correct standard by which the MPPAA was
to be assessed, according to the Peick court, was the traditional
rational purpose test of Turner Elkhorn, since the statute involved
a matter of economic policy."2 To allow otherwise, the court
warned, would give a court the opportunity to substitute its judgment for that of Congress on economic policy, an area where Congress has been granted great deference in its policy decisions.8
Having identified the appropriate inquiry, the Peick court examined the circumstances leading to the enactment of the MPPAA
to determine the constitutionality of the retroactive withdrawal liability.8 4 The court evaluated the necessity for retroactive liability,
questioning whether such action was essential to achieve the legislative purpose. Considering the congressional purpose in enacting
the MPPAA, the court found the imposition of retroactive withdrawal liability to be rational.8 5 Without retroactive liability, em78. Id. at 487-88.
79. See, e.g., Pacific Iron & Metal Co. v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension
Trust Fund, 553 F. Supp. 523 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (constitutionality of the retroactive withdrawal liability of the MPPAA upheld under the Turner Elkhorn test). See also Washington Star Co. v. International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502
(D.C. Cir. 1984), where the court similarly upheld the the retroactive withdrawal liability of
the MPPAA. In its opinion, the court expressly rejected the use of the Nachman test in
reviewing economic legislation, stating that the test was inconsistent with the long settled
standard of review for economic legislation, and that the test provided no other standard
besides mere judicial approval or disapproval of the balance struck by Congress to guide the
court in their review. Id. at 1508.
80. 724 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1983).
81. Id. at 1263. The Peick court noted that higher levels of scrutiny are normally applied only in cases involving fundamental rights, or where supervision is required to prevent
a distortion of regular democratic processes. Id. at 1265.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1251-56.
85. Id. at 1266. The court deferred to Congress' determination that retroactive liability
was necessary to prevent encouragement of early withdrawals. Id.
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ployers, by withdrawing early, would be able to take advantage of
the lengthy legislative process by shifting the financial burden to
the remaining employers and the PBGC.8 6 The Peick court emphasized that the retroactive withdrawal liability was carefully tailored
to minimize its impact on withdrawing employers.8 7 The decision
to impose retroactive liability was found to be rationally related to
a legitimate state interest, thus surviving the judicial scrutiny
88
based on the Turner Elkhorn standard.
Even though the Peick court determined that the appropriate
standard was that of minimum rationality, it also subjected the
retroactive withdrawal liability of the MPPAA to the Nachman
test. This reflects the confusion of the courts in deciding whether
the Nachman test was to replace the minimum rationality standard of Turner Elkhorn.9 In Peick, the court concluded that even
if the more stringent Nachman test was used, the retroactive withdrawal liability of the MPPAA still passed constitutional muster.9 0
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.9 1 presented
the Supreme Court for the first time with the issue of whether the
standard to be used in evaluating the constitutionality of the retroactive withdrawal liability of the MPPAA should be the traditional
rational purpose test of Turner Elkhorn, or the four factor test of
Nachman. Ending the confusion in the lower courts, the Supreme
Court held that the appropriate standard should be the traditional
rational purpose test of Turner Elkhorn.92
The decision in Gray is significant not only because it decided
the appropriate test for determining the constitutionality of the
retroactive withdrawal liability of the MPPAA, but also because it
curtailed the danger of heightened scrutiny by the courts of eco86. Id. at 1267. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
87. 724 F.2d at 1269. Initially the bill had an effective date of February 27, 1979. As
the bill moved closer to enactment, Congress moved the effective date forward to April 29,
1980 so that the final date chosen would encompass the minimum time period necessary to
prevent abuse. Id.
88. Id. at 1270.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 1270, 1271-74. Specifically, the court found: (1) that it was rational for Congress to conclude that corrective measures were necessary to make withdrawal liability effective; (2) that the employees' interest in receiving vested benefits outweighed the employers'
reliance interest either in the existing law or in withdrawing without liability; (3) that the
withdrawal liability imposed on employers was reasonable when considered with the congressional purposes in enacting the MPPAA; and (4) that the MPPAA contained adequate
moderating features. Id.
91. 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984).
92. Id. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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nomic legislation presented by the Nachman test.9 3 By rejecting
the Nachman test, the Court maintained its policy of granting deference to congressional decisions regarding matters of economic
policy.9 4 Adoption of the Nachman test would have redefined the
role of the courts in reviewing economic legislation." The court's
approach in Nachman was not one of deference to legislative judgment on matters of economic policy, but one of judging the wisdom
and utility of the policy, which traditionally has been for the legislature to decide. 6
In Gray, the Supreme Court has continued its longstanding
practice of granting deference to Congress in matters of economic

policy. This practice can be traced to the Court's landmark decision in Nebbia v. New York. 9" The Supreme Court in Nebbia held
that due process required that the economic law in question not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
be substantially related to a legitimate legislative purpose.9 "
Nebbia is significant for the Court's move away from the stringent position it had earlier taken in Lochner v. New York."9 In
Lochner, the Court held that the means selected for enforcement
of a regulatory policy must have a direct and substantial relationship to the end sought to be attained.10 0 The Lochner Court required more than minimum rationality and gave no deference to
the legislative findings of fact. 1 ' Instead, the Court concluded,
based on its own judgment, that the statute was unwise. ' °2 This
93. See generally Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 724 F.2d 1247, 1265 (7th
Cir. 1983).
94. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
95. See generally Washington Star Co. v. International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp., 724 F.2d 1247, 1265 (7th Cir. 1983).
96. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). See also
supra note 77 and accompanying text.
97. 291 U.S. 502 (1933). In Nebbia the Court upheld against a due process challenge a
New York regulatory scheme for setting milk prices. The action of the New York legislature
in passing the law was held not to be arbitrary and capricious sincg it was aimed at preventing evils in the milk industry. Id. at 530-39.
98. Id. at 525. Although a state statute was at issue in Nebbia, the Court noted that
the fifth amendment, in the area of federal lawmaking, requires that congressional action
conform with due process. Id.
99. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). A New York statute which limited the number of hours that a
bakery employee could work was struck down by the Court as violative of due process by
interfering with a person's liberty to enter into contracts. Id. at 52-53, 65-66.
100. Id. at 57-58.
101. See id. at 58.
102. See id. at 58-59. The Court disagreed with the legislature's determination that
the statute was designed to enhance the public comfort, welfare and safety. The Court
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approach is in stark contrast to the Nebbia standard, under which
the courts will give broad deference to the legislative findings of
fact and will not question the legislative findings and intent which
support the policy. 1 3
After Nebbia, the Court consistently afforded Congress wide latitude in enacting economic policy.1" 4 Illustrative of this deference
is the Court's decision in United States v. Carolene Products.'°" In
Carolene Products, the Court concluded that legislative findings of
fact should be deferred to when considering whether a rational basis exists for economic legislation.106 Furthermore, the statute was
granted a presumption of constitutionality which could be rebutted only if Congress was found not to have acted rationally.10 7
Later, in Ferguson v. Skupra,1 05 the Supreme Court virtually abandoned the use of the due process clause to strike down economic
legislation deemed to be unwise.10 9 Ferguson marked a high point
in the Court's deference to legislative motives in enacting economic
policy. The Ferguson Court held that the role of courts in reviewing economic legislation is not to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh
the wisdom of legislation," but merely to judge the rationality of
the choice made by the legislature. ° The Nachman test, however,
changed the deferential policy of these cases by encouraging courts
stated that bakery employees were protected by other laws, thus the new law was unnecessary and constituted an invalid exercise of the police power of the state. Id. at 58, 61-62.
103. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525.
104. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S.
236 (1941), where the Court held valid a state statute fixing maximum compensation for
services rendered by private employment agencies. Reaffirming its retreat from judicial activism in economic regulation, the Olsen Court stated that "[wie are not concerned.., with
the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation. Differences of opinion on that score
suggest a choice which 'should be left where . . . it was left by the Constitution-to the
States and to Congress.'" Id. at 246-47 (quoting Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 375 (dissenting opinion)). See also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), where the
Supreme Court upheld a state minimum wage law for women, stating that the statute was a
reasonable exercise of the police power of a state. Id. at 393. See also Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1942), where the Court upheld as a valid exercise of the
police power of the state a Missouri statute which provided that employees could absent
themselves from work for four hours on election days. Id. at 424-25.
105. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Carolene Products Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Filled Milk Act, which prohibited the shipment of filled (skim) milk in interstate commerce. Id.
106. Id. at 148-52.
107. Id. at 152-53.
108. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). In Ferguson, a Kansas statute which made it a misdemeanor
for any person to engage in the business of debt adjusting, except as incident to the practice
of law, was held to be constitutional. Id. at 732-33.
109. See id. at 729-32.
110. Id. at 731 (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)).
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to make their own decisions on the wisdom of the legislation
through consideration of four subjective factors. "
It was through these post-Lochner decisions that the minimum
rationality test espoused in Turner Elkhorn evolved. " ' Subsequent to the Nebbia decision, the Court has taken a limited role in
reviewing economic legislation, relying instead on the wisdom of
the legislature. Nebbia foreshadowed the Turner Elkhorn minimum rationality test by requiring deference to the legislature's policy decision, and by holding that the legislature must have acted in
113
an arbitrary and capricious manner for the statute to be invalid.
Carolene Products added the presumption that economic statutes
will be found constitutional when challenged as being violative of
due process." 4 Finally, Ferguson confirmed that the role of the
court in reviewing economic legislation was to be only as an assessor of the rationality, rather than the wisdom of the legislation. "' The Turner Elkhorn standard of minimum rationality represented the culmination of this historical line of cases. The
Nachman test threatened to cut into the Turner Elkhorn standard " " by requiring a more active role by the courts in reviewing
congressional economic legislation.
An important point to be noted is that the standard of review is
not heightened because the economic legislation under review contains retroactive provisions. Nebbia, although it did not involve
retroactivity, established the deferential standard of review for economic legislation." 7 Retroactive aspects of economic legislation,
however, when challenged as violative of due process, must independently meet the test of rationality;" 8 for the retroactive provisions to be valid, they must likewise be rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. " 9 Thus, the prevailing consideration in
111.

See Washington Star, 729 F.2d at 1508. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying

text.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 27-36.
113. See, e.g., Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525 (1933). See also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
114. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
115. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 731. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
116. See Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15-19. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying
text.
117. 291 U.S. at 525.
118. 428 U.S. at 16-17.
119. Id. The Turner Elkhorn Court stated that precedent was clear that legislation
readjusting rights and burdens was not unconstitutional solely because it upset otherwise
settled expectations, even if the effect of the legi3lation was to impose liability on past acts.
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review of the retroactive provisions is that they are contained in an
economic statute which warrants review under the minimum ra120
tionality standard of Turner Elkhorn.
The Gray decision, in upholding the use of the minimum rationality standard of Turner Elkhorn, has maintained the Court's long
standing practice of affording the legislature great deference in enacting economic policy. It is submitted that application of stricter
scrutiny by the Court would be an infringement on our democratic
form of government, where "it is up to legislatures, not [the]
1
courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.''
If the Gray Court had, conversely, adopted the Nachman test, a
danger of reverting back to the Lochner philosophy would have
been the result. A court would be free to substitute its judgment
for that of the legislature on matters of economic policy, using the
due process clause to strike down such legislation disfavored by the
court. 122 Although the court in Nachman warned that these factors
were not to be used by a court to superimpose its judgment over
that of the legislature,1 2 s the use of the test had precisely that
effect.
The Nachman test gave the courts virtually unbridled discretion
Id. at 16. See, e.g., Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938), where the Court upheld the retroactive application of a Wisconsin income tax statute which made taxable all corporate dividends, which when received in the previous year were deductible from gross income. Id. at
146-51. See also Funkhouser v. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163 (1933), where the Court upheld
the retroactive application of an amendment to section 480 of the New York Civil Practice
Act, which provided that interest was to be added to recoveries for unliquidated damages
caused by breach of contract, even though earlier contracts did not demand such payment.
Id.
120. 428 U.S. at 16. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's review of retroactive legislation, see Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionalityof Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 692 (1960). Hochman suggests that the Court primarily considers three factors in determining the constitutionality of retroactive legislation: the nature
and strength of the public interest served by the statute; the extent to which the statute
modifies or abrogates the associated preenactment right; and the nature of the right which
the statute alters. Additionally, the author points out that curative legislation containing
retroactive provisions are granted a strong presumption of constitutionality. The Court has
often held that the legislative purpose is of itself sufficient to justify the concomitant retroactivity. Id. at 697-706.
The retroactive withdrawal liability of the MPPAA would appear to be constitutional as a
curative act, since it was intended to remedy the defect in ERISA which encouraged withdrawals from multiemployer plans. See 104 S. Ct. at 2713.
121. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 729.
122. See Washington Star, 729 F.2d at 1508.
123. See 592 F.2d at 960. The court warned that "[a]lthough explicit consideration of
these factors might suggest a risk of judicial usurpation of properly legislative judgments,
failure to consider them might ultimately result in no meaningful scrutiny of the legislative
process, a result prohibited by the Due Process Clause." Id. at n.26.
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to weigh the four factors as they thought best. No standards were
applied by the court to promote uniformity in application of the
test. Shortly before the Gray decision, the court in Washington
Star Co. v. International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan,'" recognized the danger of the Nachman test, stating
that "the four factors are sweeping, relatively unweighted, highly
malleable and, thus, easily manipulatible."'' 5 This discretion undoubtedly led to the disparate results reached by the courts concerning the constitutionality of the retroactive withdrawal liability
of the MPPAA.'2 6
As discussed above, adoption of the Nachman test clearly would
have changed the Court's role in reviewing economic legislation to
a role reminiscent of the Lochner philosophy, whereby the Court
would be judging the wisdom of the policy choice made by Congress."' Yet this role had been abandoned by the Court for nearly
fifty years. 2 8 The Gray Court, by rejecting the Nachman test, has
curtailed any trend toward subjecting economic legislation to any
form of heightened scrutiny that was suggested by Nachman. By
upholding the traditional rational purpose test of Turner Elkhorn
when analyzing a due process challenge to an economic statute, the
Court is remaining consistent with its deferential stance towards
such legislation.' 9 More importantly, Gray upholds our democratic
system, precluding the courts from second guessing the wisdom of
the legislature which has been elected to enact economic policies
which are, presumably, thought to be in the nation's best interests.
Although Congress, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984,130 nullified the holding in Gray by eliminating the retroactive
withdrawal liability provisions' 3 ' of the MPPAA, the overall significance of the case remains untouched. The Supreme Court, by upholding the use of the minimum rationality standard when reviewing economic legislation, curtailed any attempt by the courts,
through use of the Nachman test, to broaden their discretion when
124. 729 F.2d 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Washington Star the court sustained the constitutionality of the retroactive application of the MPPAA against a due process challenge.
See supra note 65.
125. Id. at 1508.
126. See supra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
127. Accord Peick, 724 F.2d at 1265 & n.23.
128. See supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 899 (1984). Additionally, any amounts paid by withdrawing employers on account of such liability are to be refunded. Id.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982).
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reviewing such legislation. The precedential value of the Gray decision does not lie with the upholding of the retroactive withdrawal
liability of the MPPAA provisions, but rather in the re-affirmation
of its long-standing practice of affording broad deference to Congress in economic matters. Thus, the significance of the Court's
analysis in Gray remains as a statement of the Court's policy in
reviewing economic legislation.
Joseph R. Bielawa

